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ABSTRACT 
Promoting democratization has taken the forefront of international diplomacy in 
ensuring world stability.  Determining how best to promote democracy is challenging, 
and requires a keen understanding of a developing country’s history.  Of particular 
importance is the country’s colonial legacy, and how this legacy continues after 
independence.  This thesis examines the impact of the Japanese colonial period in Korea 
and Taiwan, and how economic and bureaucratic development in these countries 
subsequently was affected.  Examining the institutions developed during this period in 
these countries will better allow policy-makers to formulate similar (though non-colonial) 
programs in other developing countries, and this will give these developing countries a 
much better chance at success during the period of democratization. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The prospect of economic growth and the development of democracy are of the 
utmost importance in international affairs, especially since the promotion of the 
democratic peace theory, which argues that no liberal democracy has ever gone to war 
with another.  This, coupled with the strong history of democratic states in conducting 
profitable trade with one another, is a strong motivator for dominant democratic nations 
(such as the United States) to influence other states to pursue the development of their 
own democratic government.   
The question of how this can be done effectively is essential, particularly in light 
of the failures and setbacks experienced by many countries in the process of 
democratization.  Many political scientists have analyzed the circumstances surrounding 
the successful democratization of states in order to find a set of conditions and 
circumstances that are conducive to successful democratization.  
Several theories have been proposed to explain why some East and Southeast 
Asian countries have developed stronger states, successful economies and ultimately 
more democratic governments.  Some argue that the U.S. influence in the region during 
and after the Cold War was the most important determining factor in subsequent success.  
Some argue that cultural differences in East and Southeast Asian countries (as compared 
to countries in South Asia, Africa or Latin America) enabled their “miracle” growth.1 
While each of these arguments (and others) have merit, this paper will focus on 
the legacy of Japanese colonialism (or lack thereof) in these countries.  To some degree, 
most of the East and Southeast Asian countries have enjoyed support from the United 
States, especially during the Cold War.  All have historically been influenced by Chinese 
culture, and all have in some form or another felt the effects of both World War II, the 
                                                 
1 Richard Stubbs, Rethinking Asia’s Economic Miracle (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 3–13. 
 2
Korean and Vietnam wars.  The colonial legacies in these countries, however, are 
markedly different, and this difference is essential to understanding why these countries 
have developed as they have since the end of World War II.   
With this in mind, how did the experience of Japanese colonialism contribute to 
the subsequent success of Asian countries in their state and economic development?  
What implications did these developments have for subsequent democratization?   
Upon initial inspection (as detailed below), the countries that experienced the 
Japanese colonial system—one that was more intrusive and more focused on complete 
modernization and transformation than other systems—appear to have been the most 
successful countries in developing modern states and economies (namely, South Korea 
and Taiwan).  In comparison, the former French Indochina colonies (i.e., Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos), the former British colony of Malaya (which included Singapore), 
and the former Dutch colony of Indonesia have each experienced varying levels of 
success in state development, economic growth and democratization; yet none has 
reached the success of South Korea and Taiwan in any of these areas. 
While there are undoubtedly many reasons for these results, this paper will show 
that the Japanese colonial influence played a key role, by completely altering the 
trajectory of modernization in Korea and Taiwan, to creation of successful modern, 
industrial states.  The remainder of this paper will develop this concept in more detail.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
The link between strong states, economic growth and democratization has been 
studied extensively, but this paper will examine the link between a specific type of 
colonialism (i.e., Japanese) and its effect on the subsequent growth of both the strong, 
central state and a successful economy, which in turn have been taken to promote 
democracy, especially in developing countries.   
While literature in this field of study frequently measures the correlation between 
colonial legacies and state development, not as much has been said on the effects of 
colonial legacy on democratization.  Essentially, the colonial legacy represents the first 
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period of a developing country’s growth (say, Period A).  In Period B, the subsequent 
economic growth and state development is analyzed.  Period C is that period of 
successful democratization.  The majority of the existing research concentrates on either 
the link between Periods B and C, or the link between Period A and the economics of 
Period B, as opposed to the state and institutional development.   
This paper will complete the linkage between Periods A and B, by including more 
detail on political economy and institutional development. The intent is to show that the 
specific colonial legacy in Korea and Taiwan made them more conducive to developing a 
strong, central state and a modern economy, which is widely believed to be conducive (if 
not necessary) for successful democratization (thus linking Period A to Period C).   
Structuralist theories in political science argue that in order for a country to 
become a functioning, successful democracy, it must first develop the proper institutions 
to sustain a liberal democracy. This includes an efficient bureaucracy within a state that 
has well-defined functions, and a dynamic political economy, which allows for national 
and local growth.  Without these institutions, Structuralists argue, a liberal democracy 
cannot function and is destined to decline and most likely fail altogether.   
What this paper proposes is to link the Structuralist argument of the necessary 
conditions for a successful democracy to the legacies of the Japanese colonial system.  
Doing this will show how this style of colonialism produced these necessary conditions, 
and then show how similar conditions can be reproduced today.  In essence, the Japanese 
colonial system sought to reshape the given colony at every level, from restructuring 
traditional power bases into a strong, central state, to modernizing the economy, with a 
focus on land reform, technical education, and industrialization.  A state with an efficient 
bureaucracy, a growing economy, and modern institutions has all of the necessary 
conditions for successful democracy.  A state without an effective bureaucracy or a solid 




failed to establish these necessary functions of modern states (e.g., Nigeria2), is far less 
likely either to develop democracy on its own, or to maintain a democracy that was 
supplanted into its political system.   
The linkage of these two topics, while not entirely new, has been under-
emphasized by many:  Analysts of Japanese colonial legacies end their discussion with 
how these legacies produced economically thriving states, while Structuralist seek to 
explain the success of democracies based on institutions (not necessarily economic).  By 
linking these two, this paper formulates conclusions for how best to apply the lessons of 
colonial legacies to the modern international norm of aiding countries in the promotion of 
liberal democracy, thus (arguably) ensuring the democratic peace.  Specifically, certain 
types of economic and bureaucratic institutions were constructed in colonial Korea and 
Taiwan that could be constructed in modern developing states, and these institutions 
would be more effective at producing a thriving democracy then elections alone. 
The importance of this topic goes beyond improving historic accuracy in a 
debated field of study (the substance of which will be described next).  It also addresses 
one of the primary issues facing international organizations and U.S.:  How does one 
build an effective economy?  What institutions are required for a state to modernize their 
economy and integrate into the international system?  Clearly, colonization itself is not 
the answer, but certain lessons can be learned that modern states can apply to promote 
stable, modern economic growth and development. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Taiwan and South Korea show unique qualities as former colonies.  They are 
among the wealthiest and most successful countries in the world (by any measure, 
including economic growth, state/bureaucratic efficiency, and democratization), and have 
progressed more quickly from their authoritarian beginnings to democracy than other 
developing countries.  Indeed, when examining the many states in Asia, one finds cases 
of countries that are still in the process of democratization but appear to be moving in the 
                                                 
2 Atul Kohli, State-directed Development (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2004), 289. 
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right direction, e.g., the Philippines or Indonesia.  South Korea and Taiwan are strong 
cases of rapid economic growth and a strong, central state, both of which, over time, 
contributed to successful democratization.  When one asks why these countries are 
successful when so many other countries in Asia (or even Latin America and Africa) 
have had slower, even marginal, economic growth and state stability, one finds that 
examining the differences in colonial experiences to be useful in explaining the current 
conditions in a given country. 
Many Western countries had colonies in East and Southeast Asia, but a singularly 
important colonial power in Asia was Japan. Countries subjected to Japanese colonialism 
had very different experiences than countries under different colonial powers (e.g., 
England with Malaysia, France with Vietnam, or the Dutch with Indonesia).  Not only 
were the experiences of the time different, but the legacies imparted by these experiences 
have led these countries to experience along different paths to, and towards differing 
success in, democratization.   
It is useful to note a frequently-observed measure of democratic success:  
Freedom House Scores.3  Freedom House scores represent the summation of a wide 
variety of analytical indicators of successful democracy, keying specifically on the level 
of political and civic freedoms.  These indicators are frequently used by social scientist in 
comparing the level of democratization in different countries.  One can easily see that the 
former Japanese colonies score the highest (note that the scores are in x,y,z format, where 
x is political rights, y is civil liberties, and z is overall country status; the smaller the 
score, the more democratic):  South Korea achieving (1,2,F) and Taiwan scoring (2,1,F).  
These two countries experienced the strongest and most intrusive colonial program.   
Now look at countries who had a moderate level of experience with Japanese 
colonialism or Japanese expansionism during WWII:  the Philippines—(3,3,PF),  
 
 
                                                 




Indonesia—(2,3,F), Malaysia—(4,4,PF), Singapore—(5,4,PF).  Now, look at the 
countries with little to no legacy:  Vietnam—(7,5,NF), Laos—(7,6,NF), Cambodia—
(6,5,NF), Burma—(7,7,NF). 
All of the above data show a noticeable difference in the levels of 
democratization, and its associated success in different countries in East and Southeast 
Asia. There is a clear correlation between Japanese colonialism and subsequent success, 
but how does this work?  How did the Japanese colonial period shape development in 
Korea and Taiwan, and why was this style of colonialism ultimately more successful in 
quickly producing modern states and strong economies? 
The conventional wisdom in this area (see Stubbs 2005, Cumings 1987, and Kohli 
2004) is that the colonial experiences of Asian countries (as well as other countries 
throughout the world) have a noticeable effect on the success or failure of states in their 
quest to become democratic.  There is some debate over how and why these experiences 
affect countries the way they do, as well as the lessons to be learned from these 
experiences (i.e., how can we use this knowledge to more effectively promote democracy 
and economic growth, which are intimately linked, in countries throughout the world?). 
No one argues with the idea that the experience of Japanese colonialism had a 
profound effect on the colonies themselves even after the colonial period was over, but 
how did the experience of Japanese colonialism contribute to the subsequent success of 
Asian countries in their economic development and democratization? 
This paper argues that the particular style of Japanese colonialism, and the level to 
which it was enacted in different nations, had a tremendous impact on subsequent success 
in economic growth and democratization.  In particular, the more intrusive the experience 
in creating a modern society, the greater the ultimate success in democratization.  By 
creating a strong central state and developing a modern, industrial economy, both of 
which included solid institutions to guide future growth, these countries were able, after 




democracies.  Without these foundations (as is the case in many African countries), 
democratization is hindered and many states have regressed into authoritarian 
governments.   
It is important to note that both South Korea and Taiwan did experience years of 
authoritarian rule before finally democratizing.  While many historical, cultural, and even 
national security issues may have contributed to this period, when these countries 
eventually democratized, their transition was successful beyond expectation and, unlike 
many other former colonial states, they have not regressed into authoritarianism.   
One may liken this phenomenon to simple agriculture:  Consider a country’s 
economic and political culture as soil, and the idea of democracy as a seed.  To coin the 
parable of the sower, a country with a colonial legacy that laid the foundation for a truly 
modern society has good soil, so that the seed of democracy, when finally planted, can 
take strong root and grow healthily.  A country without a modern state, with all the 
institutions therein, has poor soil, so that even if the seed of democracy is planted, it will 
not take hold and, if it does initially grow, it will most likely whither and die.  In this 
way, the soil alone is not sufficient to creating democracy, as can be seen in the case of 
China—which has a burgeoning economy and a strong, central state—but which is 
certainly not democratic.   
This paper does not advocate the return to any of the harsh, oppressive methods 
employed by the Japanese, but useful lessons can still be extracted and shaped to fit a 
more modern (and certainly more acceptable) approach, particularly in countries whose 
forays into democracies have floundered, or even failed utterly. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To start with, it is important to examine what type of colonialism Japan employed 
and how (and why) this brand of colonialism was markedly different from those 
employed by other imperial powers (e.g., Britain, France, etc.).  Countries that 
experienced Western colonialism, whether in Asia or elsewhere, saw powers whose many 
efforts were centered on the extraction of resources for the benefit of the mother nation 
without, for the most part, truly seeking to modernize the host nation.  This was 
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especially true of French colonialism, as evidenced in Vietnam, where the French 
employed their “historically patrimonial” system of government in Indochina4, 
developing an institutional legacy just sufficient for the extraction of resources and the 
reduction of local resistance.5  The Indochina experience was not unique in this respect, 
as this patrimonial style of limited colonialism was evidenced in almost all French 
colonies. 
The British, perhaps the predominant colonial power in history, effected “colonial 
policies” that “led to the reestablishment of fragmented social control in societies in 
Africa and Asia…Once established, a fragmented distribution of social control has been 
difficult to transform.”6  In this regard, not only did the British follow suit in their limited 
colonialism (with the exception, perhaps, of the experiences of India, the Crown Jewel of 
the British Empire), but Migdal also describes how this fractured society remains to this 
day in post-Euro-colonial states, something very different that what we see from the 
Japanese colonial legacy.   
While the structure created by the Western colonies “denied them the chance to 
see for themselves the tumultuous opportunities of the 20th century,”7 the Japanese 
colonial legacy was completely different.  The roots of these differences are described by 
Atul Kohli:  “First, the Japanese themselves had barely escaped being imperialized,”8 a 
strategic situation, especially when the Japanese saw the effects of Western intrusion in 
their neighbor, China.  This compelled the Japanese not only to modernize their society 
but to also seek, in a very short period of time, to elevate themselves into an international 
power, so as to preclude such an unequal relationship (as existed during the years of the 
Treaty Port system) from ever happening again.9  
                                                 
4 Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1997), 9. 
5 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1988), 70–71. 
6 Ibid., 262–263. 
7 John Lonsdale, review of African Perspectives on Colonialism, by A. Adu Boahen, The Journal of 
African History 91, 3 (1988): 556. 
8 Kohli, 32. 
9 James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History (New York:  W.W. Norton, 2002), 292–293. 
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“Further, Japan colonized neighboring states with whom it shared racial and 
cultural traits.”10  This not only gave them much older historic ties to their colonies, but 
the added incentive of seeing this expansion of influence as an immediate strategic 
interest, as these countries were not halfway around the world but existed in their own 
backyard.  This created in Japan arguably the first “regional hegemon” that East and 
Southeast Asia had ever experienced.11  Unlike the realities which Western colonial 
powers had to contend with, the Japanese “could realistically consider their rule to be 
permanent.”12  Not the least of these realities was the vast distances each country would 
have to travel to reach their colonies, making effective management more difficult and 
costly.   
Perhaps more important, was the geopolitical situation that existed in Europe of 
the early 20th century.  With the rise of a unified Germany and the concurrent relative 
decline of Britain and France, these colonial powers found it much more difficult to 
maintain tight control of their possessions as increasingly more time and resources had to 
be spent countering the German threat (particularly in World War I).  Japan, largely 
insulated from these threats, was able instead to capitalize on these pressures for their 
own expansion.   
Finally, Kohli notes that “the Japanese colonial strategy was deeply informed by 
its own successful domestic reform efforts following the Meiji restoration,” a model for 
almost immediate economic and political success that a) could find no parallel with 
Western powers, and b) could reasonably be expected to be followed by Japan’s 
neighbors, something not lost on post-World War II Asian-Pacific nations, who looked to 
Japan for this very model of success.13 
 
                                                 
10 Kohli, 32. 
11 Alexander B. Murphy, “Economic Regionalization and Pacific Asia,” Geographical Review 85, 2 
(April 1995), 131. 
12 Kohli, 32. 
13 Gary Gereffi and Stephanie Fonda, “Regional Paths of Development,” Annual Review of Sociology, 
18 (1992), 425; Kohli, 88, 95. 
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So, we now come to the hallmark of Japanese colonialism: Korea.  Korea’s 
colonial legacy was one of tremendous change and upheaval.  “Colonialism  … replaced 
the factionalized and conflict-ridden institutions of aristocracy (and dynastic rule) with a 
modern, highly centralized, and extremely capable state apparatus, one which was used to 
reshape Korean society.”14  
How does this affect modern Korea?  Why should we care?  Because “there is … 
increasingly little doubt that the (state-dominated) institutional framework created by the 
Japanese played a central, if not defining role in South Korea’s subsequent social, 
economic and political development.”15  Increasingly, scholars are pointing to Japan’s 
legacy in Korea as the turning point in modern Korean history and ignited decades of 
economic growth.16  
Specifically, the Japanese created a central state with a modern bureaucracy in 
Korea and Taiwan, which included a strong central government (with ministries, merit-
based technocracy, and modern education systems), as well as a new political economy. 
This was very much akin to what was found in Japan itself:  strong government-corporate 
bonds, Meiji-style incentivized modernization, the Chaebol (equivalent of the Japanese 
zaibatsu), and even the strikingly unique style of diffusion in corporate ownership 
without the usual associated Minority Shareholder Protection (MSP).17  Additionally, 
“Japan is the only colonial power to have located various heavy industries—steel, 
chemicals, hydro-electric power—in its colonies.”18  Japan created a unique colonial 
structure in Korea and Taiwan not found elsewhere in the world.   
                                                 
14 Timothy C. Lim, “The Origins of Societal Power in South Korea:  Understanding the Physical and 
Human Legacies of Japanese Colonialism,” Modern Asian Studies 33, 3 (July 1999), 603. 
15 Ibid., 604. 
16 Mitsuhiko Kimura, “Standards of Living in Colonial Korea:  Did the Masses Become Worse Off or 
Better Off Under Japanese Rule?” The Journal of Economic History 53, 3 (September 1993), 649; Kohli, 
27. 
17 Peter A. Gourevitch and James J. Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control:  The New Global 
Politics of Corporate Governance (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2005), 18. 
18 Bruce Cumings, “The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea,” in The Japanese Colonial 
Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 
1987), 487. 
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It is important to note that literature exists that seeks to counter Kohli’s arguments 
on the effects of Japanese colonialism in Korea (and by extension other colonies).  Some 
call into question the actual data obtained from the period of Japan’s colonization of 
Korea, the actual effects of their institutionalization, and the connection of Korea’s 
postwar success with Japanese colonialism, given the great discontinuity that exists 
between the colonial period and the subsequent occupation by the U.S.  For example, 
Stephen Haggard, David Kang and Chung-In Moon argue that the colonial period had 
limited value towards modernization in Korea for several reasons, including the effects of 
the Korean War in devastating much of what the Japanese had built during the colonial 
period, and that the bureaucracy constructed by the Japanese served the interests of 
Korean elites who were not necessarily interested in pursuing a path of modernization as 
proscribed by the so-called “Japanese model.”19   
While Kohli himself responded to these issues by providing additional detailed 
data and discussion on agricultural productivity, post-war reconstruction, and elite-level 
political developmental goals, some still question his analysis.  The author’s readings of 
the literature (including most notably Stubbs and Cumings), however, show that the 
predominant opinion is in agreement with Kohli:  that the Japanese colonial experience in 
Korea had a profound and lasting impact on their economic growth and development.20   
Moving from the Korean example, one finds similar literature discussing the 
colonial legacy of Taiwan in particular as another key colony of the Japanese Empire, as 
well as other countries that had either an early colonial experience with Japan, or at least 
some period of Japanese dominance during the Pacific War (i.e., 1937–1945).21  All of 
these nations, to a varying degree based on the intensity of their experience with Japan, 
 
 
                                                 
19 Stephan Haggard, David Kang, and Chung-In Moon, “Japanese Colonialism and Korean 
Development:  A Critique,” World Development 25, 6 (1997). 
20 Cumings, 482; Stubbs, 12. 
21 Yhi-Min Ho, “On Taiwan’s Agricultural Transformational Under Colonialism:  A Critique,” The 
Journal of Economic History 31, 3 (September 1971); Norton Ginsburg, “From Colonialism to National 
Development:  Geographical Perspectives on Patterns and Policies,” Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 63, 1 (March 1973). 
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seem to exhibit the similar traits as an outgrowth of their experiences with Japan:  
movement towards centralization of authority and the foundations of a modern, industrial 
society.22   
Richard Stubbs, perhaps, sums the experience best:   
The fifty years of Japanese rule brought many significant changes which 
yielded mixed outcomes.  On the one hand, harsh treatment was 
compounded by subservient position…on the other hand, the Japanese 
brought with them to Taiwan many of the policies that had modernized the 
Japanese economy and produced such remarkable growth rates…extensive 
infrastructure… public education…investment capital and guaranteed 
resources…The overall result of Japan’s modernization of the island was a 
noticeable improvement in incomes and the population’s general standard 
of living.23  
So, given the differences between the colonial experiences from Japan and 
Western powers, one can see a distinct advantage the Japanese colonies have had in 
modernization and industrialization.  Yet, beyond simply creating a central, authoritarian 
government, how, specifically, did the Japanese create in Korea and Taiwan the 
framework of a modern state and economy?  The answer to this lies in the evolution of 
specific bureaucratic and political economic institutions in Japan, which were later 
implemented in Korea and Taiwan.   
Certain key institutions were implemented during the colonial period that enabled 
these countries to rapidly evolve into modern states.  While existing literature discusses 
elements of these institutions and how they originated in each country, it does not 
systematically trace the linkage between the implementation of these institutions and the 
creation of the foundation necessary for successful states.  Tracing the evolution of these 
institutions (e.g., the Japanese system of corporate governance, banking, and 
bureaucracy) will go to the heart of how (and why) the Japanese legacy was more 
successful (and what lessons can ultimately be learned for other countries seeking 
success).  
                                                 
22 Koji Taira, “Colonialism in Foreign Subsidiaries:  Lessons from Japanese Investment in Thailand,” 
Asian Survey 20, 4 (April 1980), 374–375. 
23 Stubbs, 43. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This paper examines different cases of colonial legacies in East and Southeast 
Asia and how this led to their success (or lack thereof) in subsequent economic growth  
 
and democratic development.  Specifically, it analyzes Korea and Taiwan as cases of 
countries with a strong, intrusive Japanese colonial legacy, as contrasted with British 
Colonialism in India, a country with a strong (yet decidedly different) colonial legacy.   
Literature on the history of the colonial periods will supply evidence used to trace 
the evolution of these institutions in Korea, Taiwan and India.  Sources include text on 
the origins of Japanese political economic systems and bureaucracy; historical text on the 
colonial periods of Korea, Taiwan and India; and articles detailing specific political 
economic institutions (e.g., central banking, civil codes, etc.).   
The paper is divided into main lines of argument:  the political economic 
implications and then the state-bureaucratic influence of Japanese colonialism in Korea 
and Taiwan (vs. British Colonialism in India).  We have already discussed some key 
aspects in the Japanese colonial system by reviewing the current literature that exists on 
Japanese colonialism and how this style differed from other colonial legacies.  Next 
examined are certain key bureaucratic and political economic institutions that evolved in 
Japan prior to the advent of Japanese power in Korea and Taiwan.  These institutions 
include political economic institutions such as corporate governance, banking systems 
and their relationship to conglomerates; also, state-government institutions such as 
meritocratic bureaucracy and modern government ministries.  
The paper then traces the evolution of these institutions in Korea and Taiwan as 
they were developed by the Japanese in both of these countries, linking the new 
institutions and systems to what existed in Japan.  Korea and Taiwan were chosen as two 
important studies because these countries were the prime colonies of the Japanese 
Empire, and were consistently so all the way through the end of World War II.  As such, 
they are the prime examples of Japanese colonial influence in Asia.   
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Finally, these institutions and legacies are compared to those economic 
institutions that were implemented by the British in India, and how the very different 
colonial legacy in India hindered it from experiencing the same rapid progress as Korea 
and Taiwan had enjoyed.  India was chosen as an alternative colonial experience to 
contrast the style of British colonialism to the Japanese system.  Furthermore, India was 
held as important to the British Empire as Korea and Taiwan were to the Japanese.  So, 
each of these colonies was of prime importance to the respective powers, yet they provide 
a useful contrast with respect to how colonialism was implemented in each.  The case of 
India illustrates how, despite an intrusive colonial experience, the specific institutions 
that were put in place were not conducive to developing a strong, central state and 
growing economy.  
All of these cases and specific institutions show a direct link between the style of 
Japanese government and economy and that existed at the time, and how these 
institutions were implemented in Korea and Taiwan, completely changing the political, 
economic and governmental landscape of both countries in ways that affect them to this 
day.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW   
This introduction comprises Chapter I of this thesis.  Chapter II analyzes the 
specific political economic legacies from the Japanese colonial period, and how these 
were absent in other colonies in East and Southeast Asia.  Chapter III discusses the state-
bureaucratic development that led to the strong state apparatus found in Korea and 
Taiwan.  Finally, Chapter IV discusses the implications of these developments in Korea 
and Taiwan with respect to democratization and how these institutions may be 
implemented in modern states to promote success.   
Organizing the thesis in this way expounds upon the three Periods earlier 
discussed in such a way that allows for the best formulation of my proposal that Japanese 
colonialism leads to strong states and economic growth, which provides developing 
countries with the best chance for successful democratization. 
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II. POLITICAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTION BUILDING IN 
KOREA AND TAIWAN 
Chapter I of this paper described the general differences between Japanese 
colonialism and the colonial style of European states, indicating the broad differences in 
approach as well as the reasons for and origins of these differences.  In particular, the 
Japanese colonial programs were much more focused on transforming the colonies of 
Korea (in particular) and Taiwan into modern, industrial states with strong central 
governments, capable of supporting Japan in its imperial conquests.   
Yet, beyond simply creating a central, authoritarian government, how specifically 
did the Japanese create in Korea and Taiwan the framework of a modern economy?  The 
answer to this lies in the evolution of specific political economic institutions in Japan, 
which were later implemented in Korea and Taiwan.  This chapter examines these 
institutions in detail.   
First examined are the key aspects of the Japanese path to economic growth and 
modernity, noting specific political economic institutions that evolved in Japan.  Next, an 
explanation is given on how these institutions were implemented and developed in 
colonial Korea and Taiwan, showing the strong connection between the lasting 
institutions that have developed in these countries and their origins in Japan.  Finally, the 
Japanese-style institutions are compared with those the British implemented in India, 
noting the differences in intent, construction and outcome between the British and 
Japanese systems.  This comparison is useful since the British colony of India was at least 
as important to the British as Korea and Taiwan were to the Japanese, and the British 
designed a comprehensive colonial system in India which was of high importance to 
them (as opposed to subsequent colonies in Africa which were primarily based on 
extracting goods instead of truly modernizing the colony itself).   
A. JAPANESE PATH TO ECONOMIC MODERNITY 
Japanese modernization, beginning with the Meiji restoration (or revolution), 
carried itself at a rapid pace, far exceeding growth in any other area of the world from 
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1870 through 1931, and even from 1870 through 1986.24  While the reasons for this 
speedy modernization are many, the modernization of Japanese political economy was 
aided strongly by several key institutions that developed during the Meiji period, and 
further evolved in the period leading up to World War II.   
The first of these institutions included the so-called “symbiotic relationship of 
Zaibatsu with the state.”25  That is, the formation of large business and industrial 
conglomerates called Zaibatsu, groups that began during the Shogunate period and 
continued into the Meiji restoration.26  The Zaibatsu “obtained government 
concessions…and took the lead in promoting Japanese economic expansion overseas.”27   
The Japanese government readily ceded power over these markets to the Zaibatsu, 
largely in an effort to maintain the support of the powerful elites who also strove to 
transition into modernity while still remaining relevant, giving the new government 
powerful partners.  “The state lavished patronage on combines able to provide the capital, 
technical experience, and the national framework of banking, transport and heavy 
industry,” all of which the Zaibatsu provided exceptionally well.28  In addition to 
becoming the most powerful industrial conglomerates, the Zaibatsu played a prominent 
role in Japanese banking, another important aspect of Japanese modernization.  Each 
Zaibatsu expanded beyond its initial base…since Japan lacked an organized capital 
market and public restraints on monopoly power, the Zaibatsu controlled most banks in 
the late nineteenth century;” they even “founded their own banks.”29  Four out of the five  
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28 Ibid., 86. 
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greatest banks in Japan were controlled by the Zaibatsu.30  The Zaibatsu became “vast 
concentrations of economic power and had huge resources apart from those associated 
with their banking interests.”31 
The banking system was specifically created and tailored for supplying 
industrialists with loans, capital and security.32  These designs went hand in hand with 
“Japan’s policy of developing her resources in the interests of national power.”33  While 
other states have certainly utilized resources for their own national power, the Japanese 
were singular during this time period:  while the majority of Western European and 
American economists were promoting laissez-faire government policies,  
The laissez-faire prescription was not for her.  Moreover, she feared for 
her security, and her leaders could not neglect the strategic aspect of 
economic development.  Hence the active part played by the State in the 
early and middle years of Meiji in the founding of the new industries.34 
Japan was keenly aware of its strategic situation, especially when compared with 
the situation it saw in China, which, having a very weak central power and disjointed 
regional policies, could not hope to stand up to the West.35  This view played a 
tremendous role in Japan’s centralization of state power during the Meiji restoration, 
which carried on through World War II, even in its programs in Korea and Taiwan 
(which will be discussed later):  “It was the state that conceived modernization as a goal 
and industrialization as a means that gave birth to the new economy in haste and pushed 
in unrelentingly.”36  Problematically, though, “the zaibatsu system, while promoting 
growth …contributed to high industrial concentration, high income inequalities, and slow 
growth of a politically independent middle class.”37  This last point is particularly 
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important in comparison to the cases of Korea and Taiwan.  While a strong capitalist 
class emerged in Japan (especially the ultra-class of the Zaibatsu), the emergence of an 
independent middle class was hindered by this very development.  Each of these aspects 
of Japanese economic development (the Zaibatsu—government connection, banking and 
financial policies) had profound effects on the rapidity of Japanese progress.  These 
institutions left a legacy not only in Japan, but also in the colonies they controlled for 
nearly half a century.     
B. IMPACT OF THE COLONIAL LEGACY IN KOREA 
In this section, the role of these political economic institutions in colonial Korea 
and Taiwan is analyzed, as well as their effects on subsequent growth in these countries.  
The key aspects of the Japanese path to economic modernity were taken from Japan and 
implemented in Korea and Taiwan during a particularly harsh period of colonial rule.   
In the preceding section, several key indicators of Japan’s economic evolution 
were detailed, elements that were unique to Japan as compared to other modernizing 
countries.  These included the particular style of government—corporate relationships, 
the bank system that developed in Japan and its relationships to powerful conglomerates 
(i.e., Zaibatsu), and finance and trade policies enacted in Japan that helped to shape their 
political economy.  This section shows how these were implemented in Korea and 
Taiwan during their colonial periods.   
The Korean state in particular all but copied the Japanese model, forcibly at first 
and later by choice (during the presidency of Park Chung Hee in the 1960s).38  The 
Japanese first changed the very structure of Korean institutions, from the top down, 
molding Korean society into an image of Japan, and in so doing promoting Japanese style 
government.  “Both Korean states have had strong bureaucracies at the center and 
relatively weak political impulses flowing up from the periphery.”39 
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The colonial experience in Korea was as planned as it was intrusive:  “Like 
reform at home, the colonial effort…was anticipatory, preconceived and planned,”40 and 
succeeded largely in changing the political economic framework tremendously.  “It might 
even be said that the Japanese period structured the post-war political spectrum.” 41  
Comparing Korea to the Japanese trajectory already discussed show the formation 
of the central state as a key aspect of the modernization of Korea.  In particular, the 
government—corporate relationships in Korea smacked of Japanese influence.  “In Korea 
the colonial power emphasized not only military and police forms of control, but also the 
developments of the peninsula under strong state auspices…Japan utilized a mighty trio 
of state organization, central banks and Zaibatsu conglomerates to industrialize Korea.”42 
“The colonial state, Japan-based Zaibatsu, and local Japanese and Korean firms 
each played a role in the growth, but the holdings of both the state and local firms paled 
in comparison with Zaibatsu interests.  The share of capital on the peninsula that the 
leading Zaibatsu controlled by 1942 has been estimated as high as three-quarters of the 
total capital investment in Korea.”43 
So we see the influence of the Zaibatsu even in the colony of Korea, from the 
heavy industrial sector and even into small business:  “Local Korean entrepreneurs in 
large-scale enterprises learned to adapt to a distinctive format of business-state 
relations.”44  The economic infrastructure created by the Japanese Zaibatsu during the 
colonial period directly contributed to the formation of the Korean Chaebol, which drove 
“Korea’s economic development…largely characterized as conglomerate driven.”45   
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“A number of large business groups called Chaebol were formed which were 
similar in form to prewar Zaibatsu in Japan.”46  Almost a carbon copy of the Zaibatsu, 
the Korean Chaebol drove economic growth during the Park presidency, much as the 
Zaibatsu had from the Meiji period through World War II.  “The government’s drive to 
create general trading companies on the Japanese model was built on an array of special 
incentives to the trading arms of the largest manufacturing conglomerates known as 
Chaebol.”47  This is clearly an influence of Japanese colonialism on Korean political 
economy, one that persists to this day in spite of the reforms of President Kim Dae-Jung 
in the late 1990s.   
The Japanese influence continues in the second aspect previously discussed in 
Japanese economic modernity:  the shaping of the bank system in Korea, which 
paralleled the bank system of Japan.  “The prominent role of state-affiliated institutions 
such as the Bank of Chosen and the Chosen Industrial Bank in large-scale finance, 
industrial and commercial enterprises deeply affected the direction and scale of private 
large-scale Korean enterprise.”48  
“The Japanese government achieved control over the Korean economy by 
1920.”49  As such, creating a new banking system, one ran by Japanese financiers with 
Koreans in notable positions (in which they could learn the trade) fostered the 
institutional legacy of the Korean banking system.  The Japanese government even 
reformed Korea’s currency in an effort to help unify and modernize Korean economy.  
“The Bank of Korea was established in 1909 to carry out the currency reform,” and was 
modeled in the fashion of the National Bank of Japan.50 
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Thus, the Japanese reshaped Korea’s political economy to match their own 
experiences, producing on the peninsula what had already proved successful on the home 
islands.  “This thirty-six years occupation of Korea by Japan had a tremendous influence 
on the development of the modern Korean management system.  Japan’s influence in the 
early days remains salient in the organizational structure of modern Korean firms.  Some 
writers suggest that organizational structures in Korea are duplications of those in 
Japan.”51  
C. IMPACT OF LEGACY IN TAIWAN 
Moving to Taiwan, one encounters similar creations in the colonial state, but with 
less of the intensity seen in the Korean case.  “The colonial state in Korea bulked much 
larger in the economy than in Taiwan.”52  Taiwan (or Formosa) was the first colony of 
Japan, won from the Chinese after the First Sino-Japanese War, 1894–95.  As such, their 
colonial program was not as developed as what was implemented in Korea.  Ultimately, 
the Korean colony proved of greater military-strategic importance as a stepping-stone 
into continental Asia directly, and thus the colonial program in Korea was driven with 
much greater ferocity than in Taiwan.     
Still, the early legacies of Japanese colonialism can be seen.  “It was in Formosa 
that Japan was to create the pattern of colonialism which was…to be applied in the 
administration and exploitation of such later conquests as Korea and Manchuria.”53  
Taiwan’s colonization was driven by Japanese strategic interests, which included 
“economic prosperity and income from Formosa.”54  The same factors later induced the 
intensive colonization of Korea.  One might even say that Taiwan was a testing ground 
for policies later to be enacted in Korea.   
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The Japanese colonial leaders set about the centralization of the Taiwanese state 
in similar fashion as was later developed in Korea:  “the establishment of a highly 
centralized and authoritarian colonial administration in Formosa…whose greatest joy was 
the annual financial statement.”55  The Japanese system of colonialism was similar to 
other powers in their quest for greater resources, but Japan accelerated their colonies’ 
economic development.  Japan, as a country with relatively few natural resources of its 
own and with imperial conquests that far outreached their initial capacity, had a vested 
interest in developing Korean economy to the maximum extent possible.  “Korea, 
together with Taiwan, was called upon to develop the non-agricultural sectors of her 
economy.”56  Importantly, the Japanese trained and educated Koreans and Taiwanese in 
their system of government and finance.57 
Hence, the focus on rapid industrialization in Taiwan was as clear as in Korea.  
Yet, an important difference between Korea and Taiwan was the lack of conglomerate-
driven progress, a key aspect of both Japan (with the Zaibatsu) and Korea (with the 
Chaebol).  Taiwan, for largely political purposes, did not develop the same powerful 
infrastructure of conglomerate businesses.   
While early roots for centralization of industry were laid during the colonial 
period, the subsequent Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) leadership wanted to maintain a 
strict monopoly on economic (as well as political) power, and thus hindered private 
ventures into heavy industry by economic elites.  Rather, the KMT promoted the already 
burgeoning Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs), which became the most 
important part of Taiwan’s economy.  While not Zaibatsu-like, the education of these 
workers and the shaping of the medium-sized enterprises did take form during the 
Japanese colonial period, and indeed were encouraged by the Japanese colonial 
government as a way to easily transition Taiwan’s primitive economy into a functional 
market economy.58     
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Looking at another important aspect of Japanese and Korean development, the 
case of Taiwan was also different:  banking.  “Banks are prohibited by law from taking 
shares in the companies to which they lend or from having representatives on the board 
of directors, in sharp contrast with Japan.”59  The corporate—bank connection was a key 
element of the growth trajectory of both Japan and Korea.  In the case of Taiwan, 
subsequent political effects driven by the KMT overruled colonial legacy, much as it had 
for the suppression of major business conglomerates.   
Still, even with the subsequent changes driven by politics after the Chinese 
Revolution, the Japanese colonial infrastructure played an important role in Taiwan’s 
development.60  “The most important achievement of Japanese rule…was a high degree 
of socioeconomic development together with the construction of a modern 
infrastructure.”61   
“The Japanese had invested heavily in industry and infrastructure.”62  This 
included creating a central banking system (albeit without the powerful influence of 
Zaibatsu-like conglomerates), unified weights and currency, and common civil law.63   
Indeed, the greatest number of laws shaping modernization in Korea and Taiwan 
were, by far, created in the Japanese government, and modeled after the fashion of laws 
and reforms that drove Japan’s success.  Table 1 illustrates several of these laws and 
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Table 1.   Major Colonial Laws and their Legal Sources  
   Korea Taiwan 
Currency Law Japanese Law Japanese Law 
Bank Laws  Japanese Law Japanese Law 
Commercial Laws Japanese Law Japanese Law 
Laws Concerning Taxation Seirei* Japanese Law 
*Seirei were laws issued by the Governor-general, and specifically pertained to the colony 
in question (i.e., did not have basis in formal Japanese Law) [After Ref. 64]64  
Thus, the political economic institution of civil law (concerning economy and 
finance) was modernized during the colonial period of both Korea and Taiwan.  And, 
having examined the other key political economic institutions of government—corporate 
relationships and the formation of the modern banking system, the effects of Japan’s 
colonial legacy in Korea and Taiwan can be clearly seen.   
D. COMPARISON WITH BRITISH COLONIAL LEGACY IN INDIA 
The impact of the Japanese colonial experience on economic development in 
Korea and Taiwan has been described thus far.  Now, this experience is compared with 
the British legacy in India.  Specifically, a brief description of the ineffectiveness of 
British colonialism when compared with the Japanese is provided.  Then, specific 
political economic institutions are analyzed that were previously discussed with respect 
to Korea and Taiwan and see how they were shaped in colonial India.   
Atul Kohli describes the British colonial period:  “the laissez-faire colonial state 
was partly responsible for India’s sluggish economy in the first half of the [20th] 
century.”65  He describes his main arguments for India’s relatively poor colonial 
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construction:  “First, the state that Indians inherited from their colonial past was modern 
and democratic yet not all that effective as an economic actor…Finally, the subcontinent  
has for a long time been characterized by a low-technology, low-productivity agrarian 
economy…low rates of savings and investment, primitive technology, and a poor 
economy with limited internal demand.”66 
Kohli further characterizes British rule as indirect,67 with British accommodations 
made with “regional and local strongmen,” and this legacy continued on into the post-
colonial period.68  This accommodation reduced the effectiveness of British (and later 
Indian) rule, limiting the penetrating ability of both governments.  This differed from the 
Japanese system in that it did not promote change in the type of governance in India at 
the local level, whereas the Japanese instituted changes in governance at every level.  The 
British subsidized the behavior of regional strongmen in an effort to ease their own 
governance.   
Not all British developments were as weak as the economic institutions; in 
particular, the Indian Army was a professional, centrally directed organization which 
provided an example for later attempts at centrality.  Still, the indirect rule of the British 
during the colonial period left a legacy of poor penetration of state power, which 
adversely affected economic growth.69  Contrasting India with Korea and Taiwan, one 
can see that both of these countries also had a largely agrarian society prior to 
colonization, yet the Japanese colonial masters instituted invasive colonial programs to 
rapidly modernize and industrialize Korea and Taiwan.  In particular, the political 
economic framework was radically changed, especially in the formation of a central, 
authoritarian government which drove modernization from the top down, penetrating 
every level of society in the same way the Meiji restoration had in Japan.  This is the 
antithesis of laissez-faire economic policy, so at a fundamental level the British and 
Japanese colonial programs were starkly different.   
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Now, the specific political economic institutions previously discussed with 
respect to Korea and Taiwan are examined and shown how they fit in the Indian colonial 
experience:  government—corporate relationships, especially with respect to large 
conglomerates that drove economic growth; the formation of national banks, as well as 
those controlled by the conglomerates; and the evolution of specific laws and regulations 
regarding political economic institutions.   
Beginning with conglomerates, the only strong corporate body that existed within 
colonial India was the British East India Company.  The East India company “established 
the essentials of empire over the subcontinent:  centralized authority, backed by 
organized armed forces and a civil service.”70  In addition to being the main economic 
power, the East India Company was also a political power, one more directly involved in 
Indian policy than the Zaibatsu in Korea.   
After the “mutiny” (or First Revolution) of 1857, the British Crown took direct 
control of the Indian colony.  This had several implications for colonial development, but 
the particular impact we are interested in is the formation of modern business 
conglomerates within India.  The British strategy after the Revolution was to “ally with 
and strengthen the position of traditional Indian elites, especially the gentry and 
aristocrats.”71  
These “strongmen” (as Joel Migdal would call them) were not the same as the 
modern corporate conglomerates that the Japanese helped create in Korea, or even the 
SMEs that took hold in Taiwan, which, while smaller than Zaibatsu or Chaebol, were still 
modern in their business approach.  This modernity was a direct result of the Japanese 
colonial programs, which were strongly penetrating and reshaping; whereas the British, 
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program served to inhibit the formation of large corporations, even with the legacy of the 
East India Company.  This pattern of striving to maintain legitimacy continued even after 
the British period ended, plaguing the governments of both Nehru and Gandhi.72   
Modern banks did exist in India, including the central Imperial Bank of India, 
which was “an amalgamation of the three ‘Presidency Banks’ of Bengal, Bombay and 
Madras.”73  This bank, though modern and similar to the central Bank of London, was 
configured largely to promote British interests in the region and, during the colonial 
period, was somewhat limited in their capacity as a central bank.74  
While Japanese banks in “Chosen” (i.e., Korea) were developed in much the same 
fashion (i.e., to facilitate Japanese interests there), the important difference was the lack 
of partnership with powerful conglomerates that used the banks as a means to raise 
capital to extensively develop colonial India.  Rather, while the banks did promote basic 
economic modernity, they failed to be as much of a driving force in Indian development 
as their counterparts in Korea and Taiwan.   
When we analyze the political economic institutions developed by the British in 
India, we find that they were not enabling of Indian economic growth, but rather hindered 
progress.  Indeed, “little was done to encourage Indian industries and there was only an 
imperfect provision of technical and industrial education,”75 quite in contrast with the 
Japanese model.  These differences directly contributed to India’s stagnant economic 
growth during and after the British colonial period, and left a legacy quite unlike the one 
found in Korea and Taiwan.   
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E. CONCLUSION 
The legacy of Japanese colonialism left a strong mark on political economic 
development in Korea and Taiwan.  Beyond simply creating a strong, central state, 
specific economic institutions evolved in these colonies that were a direct result (and, one 
might call, a descendent) of the Meiji restoration in Japan itself.  These institutions 
helped pave the way for rapid economic growth that, coupled with several conflicts after 
WWII and significant aid from the U.S., made these countries among the most successful 
economies in the world. 
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III. IMPACTS OF JAPANESE COLONIALISM ON STATE 
DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA AND TAIWAN 
A country’s success can be discussed with respect to economy (i.e., having a 
growing economy with stable and supportive economic institutions), democracy (i.e., 
having more personal liberties, civic and political freedom), or even in terms of the 
effectiveness/efficiency of the state itself (i.e., bureaucracy, civil service, other 
state/government institutions).  By any of these measures, both South Korea and Taiwan 
have enjoyed great success.  This chapter focuses on the performance of state 
mechanisms and asks the questions:  how did the Japanese colonial period affect the 
subsequent success of South Korea and Taiwan as states?  Specifically, how did the 
Japanese system contribute to forming a modern, central government with institutions 
suited towards continued economic growth? 
The key to understanding this is in analyzing the specific state institutions that the 
Japanese constructed in Korea and Taiwan during their colonial periods.  The Japanese 
colonial legacy in Korea and Taiwan directly contributed to the subsequent success of 
these countries’ state governance.  In particular, key bureaucratic institutions in Korea 
and Taiwan were derived directly from the Japanese colonial experience, enabling their 
governments to modernize and industrialize each country at a very rapid pace.  In some 
respects, these institutions (even as they existed in colonial Korea and Taiwan) were 
more ‘Japanese’ than ‘Korean’ or ‘Chinese/Taiwanese.’  In effect, Japan’s colonial 
programs completely changed the trajectory of state growth and development in Korea 
and Taiwan, so that even after World War II both countries continued to utilize the 
Japanese model of development.  This chapter first examines the key government 
bureaucratic institutions that evolved in Japan prior to the advent of Japanese power in 
Korea and Taiwan.  Next, the emergence of these institutions in Korea and Taiwan during 
the colonial period is traced.   
The importance of this focus goes beyond improving historic accuracy in a 
debated field of study (the substance of which is described next); it also addresses one of 
the primary issues that international organizations and U.S. efforts must address:  how 
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does one build an effective state?  Many countries throughout the world have good 
supplies of goods and capital that should promote healthy economies, yet have failed due 
to the lack of a general government structure.  What institutions are required for a state to 
become truly integrated into a country’s society, allowing it to penetrate each level to a 
sufficient degree that the state apparatus actually works, providing a framework for 
which the country grows and expands?  Clearly, colonization itself is not the answer, but 
certain lessons can be learned that modern states may apply to promote a stable, modern, 
and functional state. 
A. BUREAUCRATIC FOUNDATIONS IN JAPAN 
The most important aspect of the Japanese state that was constructed in Korea and 
Taiwan was the foundation of a modern bureaucracy.  The bureaucracy is the major 
institution that allows the power of the state to permeate throughout society (via many 
other institutions such as banking, military, education, etc.), and is considered by most 
political scientist to be an important part of modernization and state development.76  Max 
Weber, who was the first to study large organizational behavior, describes bureaucratic 
governance as a necessary prerequisite for modern government, particularly one that 
bases its authority on “rational grounds” (as opposed to “traditional” or “charismatic” 
grounds).77  Furthermore, in bureaucracy “the regular activities required for the purposes 
of the organization are distributed in a fixed way as official duties;”78 also, “the 
organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy;”79 finally, “operations are 
governed by a consistent system of abstract rules…[and] consist of the application of 
these rules to particular cases.”80  All of these have been deemed as important by 
sociologists to the creation of a modern state apparatus.   
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Far from the pre-modern societies that existed in these countries at the outset, the 
Japanese created and shaped this system not for the betterment of Koreans and 
Taiwanese, per se, but rather to construct a functioning government apparatus that would 
prosper, grow, and efficiently provide the resources (particularly food, oil, rubber, etc.) 
that Japan needed to sustain its own growth and continue its conquests (especially in 
China).   They used the bureaucratic system that had been developed in their own country 
in order to more efficiently utilize the benefits that modernization would bring in their 
colonies, given the functions (described above) and order that such a bureaucracy would 
bring to their governance.    
Before tracing how bureaucratic developments in colonial Korea and Taiwan 
shaped their modernization even after the end of the colonial period, it is important to 
examine the growth of the modern bureaucratic system that existed in Japan during the 
colonial period.  Prior to the Meiji restoration in the late 19th century, Japan had been 
ruled for centuries by a military governor called the Shogun, and this particular system 
(sanctioned by the Emperor) was called the Tokugawa Shogunate.  At the outset of the 
Tokugawa system, Japan, though intentionally closed off to outside influence from 
Westerners, already had the seeds of a modern bureaucracy with the advent of the central 
control and governance of the Shogunate, which lasted from 1603–1867 and shaped 
Japanese society at every level of civilian administration, including tax collection, justice, 
finance, construction, and religious supervision.81  Joel Migdal directly connects the 
establishment of these institutions with the power of states over the societies they 
govern.82  Hence, the Shogunate, in its quest to maintain dominance over the various 
daimyo (feudal lords) within Japan, established the first (though primitive) form of state 
control over feudal Japan.  Under the Shogunate, a truly centralized system emerged, one 
with all the daimyo paying tributes to the Shogunate, as well as other strictly-regulated 
duties (such as the requirement for daimyo to periodically visit and confer with the  
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Shogun in Kyoto, the requirement for strict audits of financial records, etc.).  The system 
involved into a relatively smoothly operated structure which paralleled the development 
of bureaucracy in the West. 
This transformation of national leadership was all predicated on the burgeoning 
bureaucracy that was only enhanced during the Meiji Restoration, a period which had 
taken all the initial steps towards a modern bureaucracy and crystallized them into a 
coherent whole.  Japan modeled its bureaucracy (as well as its constitution) on 
Bismarck’s Prussia.83  This system was labeled by Thomas Ertman as “Bureaucratic 
Absolutism.”84  This type of system was characterized by a strong, centralized state with 
a deep-reaching bureaucratic organization, one that had established ministries and a well-
defined power structure, which allowed the transmission of policy into real results that 
were permeated into all levels of society.  This system was different from other European 
states (such as Britain) due to the lack of a strong, democratic (and effective) political 
organization (e.g., the Parliament); rather, the various bureaucratic institutions (led by the 
Kaiser via the Chancellor), not the German Diet, were the supreme authority of the state.  
Japan took this model and adapted it to its own context, with the Emperor replacing the 
Kaiser, and the oligarchs leading the bureaucracy in a highly authoritarian state.  (It 
should be noted that while the Emperor had authority to rule as the Kaiser had, the 
oligarchy of leadership in Japan exercised the real day-to-day power and decision-
making, much as Chancellor Bismarck had).      
This authoritarianism had its roots in the cultural traditions of feudal Japan, 
traditions which Japan was not far removed from even as it underwent its rapid and 
sweeping modernization.  “Civil and military bureaucrats were the direct heirs of the 
samurai ‘oligarchs’ who carried out the Meiji Restoration.”85  Hence, the power of these 
bureaucrats was deeply rooted in Japanese society.  The restoration forced the transition 
from the primitive bureaucracy of the daimyo into the more modern structure of the 
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oligarchy, which made the principal decisions in Japanese society, with the Emperor 
providing legitimacy for their operations.  This is different from the more strictly 
representative system that evolved in England, as the Japanese Diet did not have the real 
power of decision-making (i.e., they had de jure power from the constitution, but de facto 
power resided with the oligarchy).   
As time progressed and the middle class became more prominent in Japanese 
society, the old social class barriers were less limiting with respect to government work, 
yet this only succeeded in creating a new, technocratic elite within the bureaucracy,86 one 
which vied for power with other control centers in Japan.  This evolution coincided with 
Japan’s conquests in Korea and Taiwan, and thus these colonies were heavily shaped by 
the prevailing style of governance in Japan of that time.      
This governance was affected by a combination of three power groups, the 
military, the monopoly capitalists (zaibatsu) and the bureaucrats.87  An important 
example of the authoritarian nature of the Japanese state was the specific relationship 
between the bureaucracy, the Diet and the Emperor.  Modern and professional, the 
bureaucracy never operated within the context of party control over the state apparatus as 
had happened in most other states; rather, the bureaucrats were technically servants of the 
Emperor.88  Furthermore, “although parliamentary democracy was also set up in a 
somewhat limited fashion toward the end of the 19th century, the policy apparatus 
remained firmly under the control of the bureaucracy.”89  While this was changed during 
the American occupation after World War II, the preeminence of the bureaucracy was an 
important facet of Japanese government at this period of time (a fact not lost to the 
Japanese in their colonial conquests).   
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In the context of the security situation Japan found itself in during this period (i.e., 
beset by European powers that had already defeated and embarrassed China), “a strong 
executive was imperative to protect Japan against both potential external aggression and 
internal disorder.  The effect of this situation was to establish the executive, the 
bureaucracy, as the all-important and omnipotent branch of the government.”90  Hence, 
the bureaucracy was a powerful force in Japanese government, given power and 
legitimacy directly from the Emperor, and thus they (and not landed classes) controlled 
policy.91  Many argue that the strength of this authoritarian bureaucracy was precisely 
what Japan needed to rapidly modernize.  “The civil bureaucracy through a variety of 
activities played a major role in the diversion of Japan’s resources toward successful 
growth-producing activities.”92  Additionally, “one of [the bureaucracy’s] major charges 
was to carry out the technical aspects of the country’s industrialization and 
modernization.”93   
The bureaucracy created modern financial institutions (as discussed in Chapter 
II), formed the government apparatus and its ministries that would provide for greater 
efficiency in day-to-day operations, modernized the Japanese military and education 
system, modeled the modern system of diplomacy after the Western powers, and created 
many other institutions that allowed Japan to modernize rapidly.  Of particular 
importance were the modernization of trade and the opening of Japanese borders to 
foreign influence, which allowed the Japanese to have access not only to more advanced 
goods and services, but also to key knowledge factors that would enable Japan to 
compete with the Western powers.   
Hence, the bureaucracy played a central role in modernizing Japan, allowing it to 
move beyond a traditional agrarian society, and enabling it to employ modern techniques 
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to rapidly improve their society, such to the extent that post-colonial Korea and Taiwan 
(in spite of their anger over colonial brutality) willingly utilized the Japanese model in 
their development,94 seeing how successful the Japanese had become (loss in World War 
II notwithstanding) and this success allowed Korean leaders to overcome anti-Japanese 
political sentiment enough to give way to the adoption of Japanese-style governance.   
B. COLONIAL IMPACT ON KOREA AND TAIWAN 
The bureaucracy, as discussed previously, played a central role in the Japanese 
government and its efforts towards rapid modernization and growth, and this centrality 
was imbued in the colonial governments of Korea and Taiwan.  This section shows how 
the Japanese transplanted these institutions in Korea and Taiwan, and how this legacy 
survived after World War II and continued to play an essential role in both countries.  
Migdal describes South Korea and Taiwan as being “among the highest in state 
capabilities” in developing countries after World War II, and attributes this success to the 
power of the colonial state construction (in combination with the subsequent threat of war 
during the Cold War acting to galvanize the state into a functional, central authority).95  
The Korean state in particular all but copied the Japanese model, forcibly at first and later 
by choice (during the presidency of Park Chung Hee in the 1960s).96  The Japanese first 
changed the very structure of Korean institutions, from the top down, molding Korean 
society in an image of Japan, and in so doing promoted Japanese style government.  
“Thus, a highly articulated, disciplined, penetrating colonial bureaucracy substituted both 
for the traditional Yi Dynasty and for indigenous groups and classes that…would have 
accomplished Korean development themselves.”97   
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1. Korea 
Korea had an agrarian past, one that hardly resembled the Japanese system of 
bureaucracy at the outset of the colonial period.  Furthermore, “Korea had a centralized 
and ostensibly strong bureaucracy, but the Yi was in fact a relatively weak state.”98  So, 
while a bureaucracy did exist in Korea before the advent of the Japanese colonial system, 
it was weak and certainly not modern.  Much of what passed for institutionalism in Korea 
was steeped in ancient traditions, and officials had little conception of scientific 
application of finance, administration, etc. that would have allowed them to transition 
easily into the modern age (e.g., modern education, financial system, military, etc.).  The 
system implemented by the Japanese created a bureaucracy that was not only modern and 
efficient, but was inherently more “Japanese” than “Korean.”   
Colonialism…replaced the factionalized and conflict-ridden institutions of 
aristocracy (and dynastic rule) with a modern, highly centralized, and 
extremely capable state apparatus, one which was used to reshape Korean 
society.99  
The Japanese colonial administration instituted three central institutions in the 
new Korean state, all taken from Japan’s own experience, with the bureaucracy at the 
center of each:  “a relatively corrupt and ineffective agrarian bureaucracy was 
transformed into a highly authoritarian and penetrating political organization; the state 
established close and working production-oriented alliances with the dominant classes; 
and a well-developed system of state control of the lower classes was created.”100 
Japan was in the unique position of being a colonial power in its own geographic 
area.  Not content to create a weak state that so many other European powers created in 
their colonies, the Japanese transformed the entire structure of Korean government.  
“Korea’s traditionally centralized, but relatively powerless, state was replaced by a firm, 
often harsh, central colonial authority…[including] a greatly strengthened 
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bureaucracy…[which] reached down into every village and urban neighborhood.”101  
This penetration is precisely the type of institutional action that Migdal attributes to a 
strong, central state.102  This state had the ability to truly modernize itself into a 
prominent player in international affairs.  Indeed, the system created in Korea was 
perhaps stronger than the one that existed in Japan, all predicated on the need for control 
of Japan’s new colony (as well as the fact that the Japanese saw Koreans as being less 
worthy than themselves).   
This transformation was hardly by accident.  The Japanese had pressing strategic 
needs (especially food resources and labor) that drove them to maximize the quality, 
effectiveness and usefulness of their colonies in both Korea and Taiwan.  The colonial 
experience in Korea was as planned as it was intrusive:  Like reform at home, the 
colonial effort “was anticipatory, preconceived and planned.”103  It succeeded largely in 
changing the government framework tremendously in ways that remain to this day.  “It 
might even be said that the Japanese period structured the post-war political 
spectrum,”104 influencing every form of government even after the American occupation 
period had ended.   
Included in this long-range style of thinking were the Japanese administrators’ 
efforts to educate and include Korean workers within their bureaucracy.  To develop its 
colonies to best meet their needs, the Japanese spread their bureaucracy throughout Korea 
“to guide its colony along a developmental course that seemed natural to these officials.”  
As part of this indoctrination, the Japanese colonial government “incorporated into their 
colonial civil service as many well-educated Koreans as they could effectively use,” in 
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period they perceived would be required to invest such a large pool of Japanese 
manpower to the colony, thus creating a self-sustaining bureaucratic apparatus which 
lasted well past the end of the colonial period.105 
As previously discussed, some critics have called into question the actual data 
obtained from the period of Japan’s colonization of Korea, the effects of their 
institutionalization, and the connection of Korea’s postwar success with Japanese 
colonialism, given the great discontinuity that exists between the colonial period and the 
subsequent occupation by the United States.106  In spite of this, it is very important to 
note that while World War II and the Korean War did destroy much of the industrial base 
in Korea, it did not eliminate the legacy of the Japanese-style bureaucracy, or the 
memories of the civil servants who were trained by the Japanese.    
Over 400,000 Koreans were at one point qualified by the Japanese to work in 
their modern bureaucracy, leaving after the war a “sizable cadre of Japanese-trained 
Korean bureaucrats who virtually took over the day-to-day running of a truncated South 
Korea.”107  These memories were not limited to the South Koreans either.  “Both Korean 
states have had strong bureaucracies at the center and relatively weak political impulses 
flowing up from the periphery.”108 
“Whether it was in the military, the bureaucracy, or the polity, Americans during 
the Occupation found themselves playing midwife to a Japanese gestation, rather than 
bringing forth their own Korean progeny.”109  This fact was not lost on the American 
occupation forces.  The central bureaucracy in Seoul was not only carried over virtually 
intact after 1945, but American Occupation authorities often required that Koreans have 
experience in the colonial apparatus before employing them.110   
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While broad, sweeping reforms were instituted by the Americans during the 
occupation, “The bureaucracy had emerged as the one political institution to survive the 
Second World War and the American occupation relatively unscathed.”111  This 
bureaucratic framework rendered stability to the South Korean government in a tenuous 
social and political situation that led up to the Korean War.  “There is…little doubt that 
the (state-dominated) institutional framework created by the Japanese played a central, if 
not defining role in South Korea’s subsequent social, economic and political 
development.”112 
Even after the Korean War, General (and later President) Park Chung Hee 
purposefully employed the Japanese system to an even greater extent than had been used 
by Syngman Rhee, to the extent of copying not only the Japanese style of finances and 
economy (as discussed in Chapter II), but also more deeply entrenching the Korean 
bureaucratic system into the Japanese model.  Indeed, Olsen sums up the colonial 
administration and its effects on Korean bureaucracy:  “a credible case can be made that 
postwar Korea’s political-economic ability to cope with the modern world’s challenges 
and the infrastructure that both postwar Korean states used to organize their governments 
owes a debt to the legacy of Japan-induced modernization.”113 
2. Taiwan 
Much as was done in Korea, the Japanese colonial system in Taiwan set about 
restructuring the country’s bureaucratic, political and economic organization.  It was a 
colonial policy which was developed with great care and foresight.  In particular, Japan 
established “a highly centralized and authoritarian colonial administration,” one in which 
the bureaucracy played a central role in reorganizing Taiwan into a modern state.114 
Prior to the annexation of Korea after the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese were 
already well on their way to developing Taiwan from the bottom-up.  Lacking even a 
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weak central bureaucracy (as existed in Korea prior to colonization by Japan) and instead 
beginning with a feudal system of governance under the Qing, Taiwan’s modernization 
was even more striking (although initially not as successful, especially given that Taiwan 
was Japan’s first colony).  As a Japanese colony, Taiwan developed an efficient 
administrative system, an extensive infrastructure, an agricultural sector that was, after 
Japan, the most advanced in Asia, an industrial sector, and modern commercial and 
financial institutions.115  Additionally, the Japanese developed an education system to 
modernize business and government practices, as well as its managerial practices,116 
which played a major role in modernizing not only industry, but also governance under a 
central bureaucracy.   
The Japanese colonial government created new administrative systems of 
bureaucracy that reshaped the agricultural basis, unified currency, developed 
transportation and communication infrastructure, and modern education and health 
systems, all guided under a strong bureaucracy modeled after the successful Japanese 
system.117  A separate ministry was developed for each of these areas, all presided over 
by the colonial bureaucrats (as was done in Korea).  Even after annexing Korea in 1910, 
Japan continued to develop Taiwan’s economy and bureaucracy.  In the context of 
increasing tensions between China and Japan (which led to the Second Sino-Japanese 
War) and the Great Depression of the 1930s, this emphasis on development only 
expanded.  “As relations between China and Japan deteriorated in the late 1920s and the 
1930s, Japan felt the need to assimilate and to Japanize the Taiwanese, using primary 
education as its chief instrument.”118 
As the bureaucracy remained relatively intact in South Korea following the end of 
World War II, so was the system the Japanese had implemented in Taiwan, and which the 
incoming KMT “was able to take advantage of an existing, almost ‘instant,’ well-
                                                 
115 Yhi-Min Ho, “On Taiwan’s Agricultural Transformational Under Colonialism:  A Critique,” The 
Journal of Economic History 31, 3 (September 1971), 231. 
116 Prybyla, 63. 
117 Stubbs, 42. 
118 Ho, 686. 
 41
developed administrative structure.”119  While the political context of the KMT’s 
government in post-War Taiwan was quite different that the one found in South Korea, 
both shared the tendency towards a strong, central government which shaped every 
aspect of continued growth and development.  Indeed, the KMT would very likely not 
have been able to step into Taiwan following the Chinese Communist Revolution and 
create a successful period of martial law if Taiwan itself had not already undergone a 
successful period of modernization under the Japanese (a framework employed 
masterfully by the KMT).    
C. CONCLUSION 
The legacy of Japanese colonialism left a strong mark on bureaucratic 
development in Korea and Taiwan.  Beyond simply creating a strong, central state, 
modern institutions evolved in these colonies that were a direct result (and, one might 
call, descendents of) the Meiji restoration in Japan.  These institutions helped pave the 
way for continued growth and development even after the colonial period, including a 
successful (albeit long) transition to democracy.  By examining the link between the 
bureaucracies that developed in Japan to those developed in Korea and Taiwan during the 
colonial period, as well as how these developments shaped their political and economic 
institutions in general, a better understanding of this model for success can be reached, 
and developing countries (and their patrons) can utilize these models more effectively.   
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IV. POST-COLONIAL CHANGES AND THE INTERVENING 
FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN TAIWAN 
AND SOUTH KOREA 
The preceding chapters have illustrated the importance of the Japanese Colonial 
system in modernizing Korea and Taiwan.  Compared with the trajectories of 
development that these colonies were on during the period of Chinese-dominated 
influence, it is easy to see that the Japanese period, however harsh, accelerated the 
development of Korea and Taiwan’s government and bureaucracy as well as its economic 
institutions and growth.  These two developments were essential to the success of Korea 
and Taiwan in further development after the colonial period/World War II and ultimately 
to their democratization.   
The key to explaining this lies in the post World War II Korean and Taiwanese 
institutions:  what Japanese-implanted institutions survived?  How were they modified?  
Or did Korea and Taiwan revert back to their pre-colonial styles of government?  How 
did the involvement of the United States effect this transformation and development into 
the remainder of the 20th century?  This chapter traces the continuance of the Japanese 
system in Korea and Taiwan after the conclusion of World War II.  In particular, it shows 
that in spite of anti-Japanese sentiments that continue to this day, the Japanese-style 
system remained firmly re-established after World War II, and that the key institutions of 
government, bureaucracy and economy became entrenched even further into Korea and 
Taiwan’s state apparatus’.  
Finally, the issue of democratization is discussed:  how did the Japanese colonial 
legacy contribute to democratization?  Why did democracy not take hold in South Korea 
or Taiwan until well after the end of World War II (almost until the end of the Cold 
War)?  What intervening factors led to this delay?  This last portion of this chapter 
addresses these issues, and shows that democratization was not the primary focus of 




War realities, democracy was not allowed to develop until late into the Cold War period.  
These specific realities, as well as what path led South Korea and Taiwan to eventual 
democracy, are addressed.   
A. POST-WAR KOREA 
The changes in the Korean system of government (specifically the South Korean 
government) by the Japanese occurred along two main branches:  modernizing Korea’s 
economy, and modernizing its government apparatus.  Beginning first with Korea’s 
economy, Chapter II traced the implementation of modern economic forms and 
institutions in colonial Korea, including corporate-government relations, central banking 
and financial policies.  How did this change after World War II?   
After a period of instability immediately after World War II leading up to the 
military coup of 1961, very little changed with respect to the economic institutions and 
policies of the South Korean government.  With the regime of President Park Chung-hee, 
central banking continued, corporate-government relationships grew but remained 
modeled after the Japanese system, and financial policies remained the staple of a central 
government.120   
The government itself did not revert to a more traditional Asian state, with its 
tributaries to China, but rather remained a strong, central state with a working 
bureaucracy and the many government institutions that were put in place during the 
colonial period were only changed so as to allow the Koreans themselves to directly reap 
the benefits of these institutions.  During the colonial period, Japan was the primary 
recipient of the earnings that had increased during Korea’s period of modernization.121  
The greatest real change that occurred after the war was to take Japan out of the picture:  
Koreans would now control their own destiny.   
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The form of the institutions themselves did not change:  government ministries, 
while now run by Koreans, still existed and performed the same functions; Koreans still 
paid income tax, still were educated in modern schools, still had a police and security 
force, and still had medical treatment.  Hence, the structures of the Korean government 
did not truly change in a fundamental way except that they now served the Korean people 
directly.   
During the presidency of General Park Chung-Hee, pragmatism over Korea’s 
situation with respect to North Korea led Korean leaders to more actively seek Japanese 
assistance in the running of their government and finances.  The so-called “Japanese 
model” is no mystery, as Japanese experts were even employed by the United States in 
South Korea to train their Korean counterparts.122  President Park only increased this 
interaction with the Japanese, realizing that they had successfully used this model of 
development to become one of the most powerful economies in the world.  Furthermore, 
acknowledging the success of this model and seeking for Japanese aid in education and 
especially in trade only served to more deeply entrench the Koreans in the Cold War 
alliance system in Northeast Asia.123   
So, contrary to what some scholars have written about the drastic changes that 
took place after the Korean War (see Haggard, et. al. in Chapter I), the only fundamental 
change in Korean government and economy was to remove Japan as the primary 
beneficiary of Korean progress.  While the most industrialized portions of the Korean 
colony had been established in the North, subsequently lost as a resource to the South at 
the end of World War II, the roots of the Japanese system ran strong:  the educated class 
of Koreans had been taught according to the Japanese system.  The United States, for its 
part, had no solid replacement for the Japanese system; in fact, its plan was a very weak 
and nebulous one (contrary to the more developed plan the Soviet Union had for the 
North).124   
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Hence, when the time came for the United States to move beyond merely being an 
occupying force in South Korea, the United States, for lack of a better plan, sought aid 
from the very Japanese they had expelled from the country.  While the Japanese 
government had been demilitarized, and while the major Zaibatsu conglomerates had 
been abolished, the rest of the Japanese system of economy and bureaucracy had 
remained largely unchanged.  So, given the initial education that Korean bureaucrats, 
technocrats and businessmen had, and given that the United States was unable to offer an 
alternative to this style of government, the Koreans simply continued to use this system.  
In the years following the Korean War and during President Park’s regime, this system 
became even more entrenched in the Korean state, and remained so, without any 
fundamental changes, well after Korea’s democratization.   
B. POST-WAR TAIWAN 
After World War II, Taiwan was returned to China from Japanese control, and 
continued to exist as a province until 1949, when the Kuomintang (KMT), led by General 
Chiang Kai-shek, retreated from mainland China to Taiwan.  The KMT assumed control 
of the island, and found that the Japanese institutions, which had experienced little 
change in the short time after World War II, provided the perfect setup for the party to 
control the island in an authoritarian manner.125, 126   
As was the case in South Korea, the only fundamental difference in Taiwanese 
institutions following the war were that the KMT now assumed the beneficiary role, on 
behalf of the Chinese in Taiwan.  Interestingly, the Taiwanese had a much more positive 
outlook of the colonial experience than the Koreans, and experienced little of the anti-
Japanese sentiment that inhibited some Koreans from accepting Japanese aid and support.  
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Hence, the Taiwanese, backed by their American allies, welcomed Japanese assistance in 
the form of increased trade, technical training and investment.127   
As discussed in Chapter II, an important difference existed between the post-war 
development of the Korean and Taiwanese economies:  Taiwan did not develop the same 
type of conglomerate-driven growth, which was a key aspect of both Japanese (with the 
Zaibatsu) and Korean (with the Chaebol) development.  Taiwan, for largely political 
purposes, did not develop the same powerful infrastructure of conglomerate businesses.   
While early roots for centralization of industry were laid during the colonial 
period, the subsequent KMT leadership wanted to maintain a strict monopoly on 
economic power, thus hindering private ventures into heavy industry by economic elites.  
Rather, the KMT promoted the already burgeoning Small and Medium sized Enterprises 
(SMEs), which became the most important part of Taiwan’s economy.  The education of 
these workers and the shaping of the medium-sized enterprises took form during the 
Japanese colonial period, and indeed were encouraged by the Japanese colonial 
government as a way to easily transition Taiwan’s primitive economy into a functional 
market economy.128     
In the realm of bureaucracy, the KMT was able to basically assume the role the 
Japanese had created while ruling the island, and used these institutions to effectively 
manage their authoritarian regime.   
C. DELAYING DEMOCRATIZATION? 
Chapter I described three nominal time periods (or phases) for growth in former 
colonial countries:  The colonial legacy represents the first period of a developing 
country’s growth (Period A); Period B, the subsequent economic growth and state 
development; and Period C, the period of successful democratization.  Focusing on the 
initial transition from phase A to B, this paper has included significant detail on political 
economy and bureaucratic development within the framework of institutions, thereby 
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showing that the specific colonial legacy in Korea and Taiwan made them more 
conducive to developing a strong, central state and a modern economy.   
These institutions are widely held to be to be prerequisites for successful 
democratization.  Hence, the model suggests that a country’s success at democratization 
is directly related to its colonial legacy via the types of bureaucratic/government and 
economic institutions that were developed during this time.  Furthermore, the trajectory 
of the country during the post-colonial phase also plays a significant role:  did the country 
abandon its colonial roots?  Did another system take the place of the system that evolved 
during the colonial period?   
The Japanese colonial system sought to reshape Korea and Taiwan at every level, 
from restructuring traditional power bases into a strong, central state to modernizing 
economy, including a focus of land reform, technical education and industrialization.  A 
state with an efficient bureaucracy, a growing economy and modern institutions are all 
necessary conditions for successful democracy.  Is this set of initial conditions sufficient?  
Why did Korea and Taiwan take so long to develop democracies when the United States, 
arguably the world’s premier advocate for democracy, was their principal ally?  What 
other intervening factors could have halted this development?   
The answer for both countries begins in their specific political situations 
immediately following the end of World War II.  Beginning with South Korea, the United 
States had tried to install a democratic system within Korea’s fledgling state, including 
the election of South Korea’s first president, Syngman Rhee.  Both the ROK and DPRK 
claimed to be the legitimate representative government for all of Korea.  As such, both 
President Rhee in the South and Kim Il-sung in the North pursued an aggressive program 
of complete control over their governments.  In particular, President Rhee implemented 
many programs that politically isolated himself from many of his initial supporters, 
whom he later brutally suppressed.   
The United States, for its part, had little knowledge of Korea before World War 
II, and in the war’s aftermath was much more focused on preventing the fall of Western 
Europe than on ensuring that the seeds of democracy it had sown in South Korea came to 
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fruition.129  Hence, President Rhee was able to change the political trajectory of the 
South Korean people from democratization to authoritarianism, a style of governance that 
Rhee’s successor, General Park Chung Hee, was more than happy to continue in his 
military dictatorship.   
Had the United States acted to intervene in South Korea’s domestic political 
situation, this progression of authoritarianism may have been averted.  Instead, the United 
States, in its search for allies around the world against the spread of communism, was not 
about to alienate one of its staunchest allies in East Asia.  Instead, it continued to support 
the South Korean state in nearly every way imaginable, effectively legitimized the 
authoritarian regime.   
In the case of Taiwan, the KMT played a more immediate and direct role in 
turning the country into an authoritarian state.  Through the early 1980s, Taiwan was 
governed by the KMT, which formed a dictatorship that lasted until 1987.  During this 
period the KMT maintained martial law over the country, with the government acting in 
accordance with the “Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist 
Rebellion,” provisions which lasted until 1991 when they were finally abolished by the 
National Assembly.130   
During this period of martial law, thousands were imprisoned for political 
dissidence, and in general there was substantial suppression of political and civil liberties.  
The KMT believed (as did the Chinese Communist Party of the People’s Republic of 
China, PRC) that it had to maintain strict control over the populace in order to retain not 
only political survival for the party itself, but also to maintain sovereignty over Taiwan at 
first as a part of its claim at being the legitimate government over all of China, and then 
later as an independent country from the PRC.131  This fear was only exacerbated after 
continuing diplomatic pressure from the PRC, including the Taiwan Straits crises, first 
from 1954–1955, and secondly in 1958.   
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The KMT sought strongly, and gained, strong support from the United States 
against the PRC.132  This support included not only diplomatic support, but also 
substantial economic (from increased trade and financial aid) and military support (from 
arms sales as well as direct support from the U.S. armed forces, such as the U.S. Navy’s 
7th Fleet action during the second Taiwan Strait crisis).  In all of this, the United States 
asked for very little in return with respect Taiwan’s domestic political situation, relying 
on the KMT to quell any communist uprisings.   
This anti-communist policy was of prime importance to the United States, and 
shaped U.S. diplomacy tremendously with its dealings with Taiwan, South Korea and 
also Japan.  As was the case with South Korea, the United States could have demanded 
greater democratic freedom, political and civil liberties, and a reduction of the oppression 
many of the Taiwanese experienced.  Instead, the U.S. government subsidized the KMT, 
which only delayed the process of democratization.   
Beyond the issues of the regional security situation during the Cold War and the 
political predilections of those in power in both countries, it can be argued that the 
Japanese system left in South Korea and Taiwan, which was only enhanced and further 
exploited during the Cold War, may have actually contributed to inhibiting 
democratization during the Cold War.  The Japanese system of bureaucracy, establishing 
a priority on meritocratic employment and technocratic decision-making, did allow for 
efficiency in the day-to-day operations of the government and society in South Korea and 
Taiwan.  It also, however, created a state mechanism with powerful penetrating 
capability, and those in power in both countries used this penetrating power to their best 
advantage, which, as previously discussed, was to suppress civil and political liberties.  
Hence, the strong state did not promote democracy in and of itself, and in the short term 
served to diminish liberty, and thereby strengthened authoritarianism, in both countries.   
During the 1980s, both South Korea and Taiwan experienced tremendous political 
change, as both countries (albeit for different reasons) began a process of democratization 
that has proven stable and lasting.  The international realities for both countries were in 
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flux, beginning first with the Soviet Union’s sharp decline in power, causing a decrease 
to the threat of the spread of communism.  The PRC was gaining more and more 
acceptance as a country, with many other states normalizing diplomatic relations with the 
PRC, including the United States.  Initially seen as a great threat to Taiwan and South 
Korean sovereignty in the start of the Cold War, both countries began to follow the 
example of the United States and Japan in openly trading with the PRC, a process which 
served to increase economic ties while simultaneously decreasing diplomatic tension.   
In Taiwan, the old vanguard of the KMT finally left office, allowing a younger 
and more progressive generation to initiate democratic reforms.  Martial law ceased in 
1987, and the “Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist 
Rebellion” were abolished in 1991.  New political parties were created, and eventually 
succeeded in winning the government over the KMT.  In South Korea, the political 
suppression that occurred under the Fourth and Fifth Republics finally caused 
tremendous domestic unrest in the country, with student and popular demonstrations 
occurring and such a rate that finally the increasing political pressure (both 
internationally and domestically) led to the reformation and democratization of the 
Korean government in 1987.   
D. CONCLUSIONS ON DEMOCRATIZATION 
During the entire period from the end of World War II through the end of the 
Cold War, the bureaucratic and political economic institutions underwent very little 
fundamental changes.  To echo the analogy used in the first chapter, the seeds of 
democracy in both Korea and Taiwan had been planted in the good soil of a strong, 
central state with bureaucratic and economic institutions that would support 
democratization.  Intervening domestic and international political factors served to halt 
the process of democratization throughout most of the Cold War, but what is more telling 
is that when democracy finally took hold, neither country ever looked back. 
Many countries that attempt to democratize fall prey to the perils of the process of 
democratization itself.  Without a solid economy to sustain growth for the well-being of 
both the state and its citizens, and without a centralized bureaucracy to handle the day-to-
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day non-political running of government, new democracies almost invariably fail as 
states.  Tremendous international support is required to keep these countries from passing 
the tipping point, yet this support is only temporary and cannot be sustained indefinitely.  
Given the current global financial crisis, one can easily see how a country that cannot 
sustain its own government cannot rely on international aid to maintain stability.   
Atul Kohli discusses the role of state-directed development by stating that those 
states that have developed a strong, central government will be most successful as states 
and as economic powers.  He classifies states as cohesive-capitalist (such as South 
Korea), fragmented-multiclass (such as India) and neopatrimonial (such as Nigeria),133 
with the central difference in each being the level of state development in bureaucracy 
and government.  Kohli found that the more centralized and developed a former colony’s 
state government (i.e., the more “cohesive capitalist”) the more successful it would be as 
an independent state and as an economic power.   
Why some countries are more “cohesive capitalist” and others more 
“neopatrimonial” (and thus less successful as states) lies first in their colonial history and 
next in the subsequent political climate (both domestically and internationally) the 
country found itself in.  What was the colonial legacy?  Did it support a strong, central, 
developed state and modern economy?  With respect to state development, did the former 
colony continue along the same trajectory as it began with?  Were there other intervening 
factors to change the trajectory?  All of these are essential questions to ask when 
analyzing why a country was more (or less) successful at not only forming a successful 
state and economy, but also in why some countries were more successful at 
democratizing than others.   
This chapter has shown the impact that the Japanese colonial system had on 
changing the government of Korea and Taiwan, and how this effect lasted well beyond 
World War II and the Korean War.  It is important to note that the bureaucracy and 
modern economy alone did not guarantee democracy in either of these countries, nor does 
this paper argue that a strong, central government and modern economy will guarantee 
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democracy in any country (see the example of the People’s Republic of China).  Rather, a 
developing country without these modern institutions will most likely fail at 
democratization, whereas a country with these institutions will have a much better chance 
at succeeding.  The impetus for democracy must flow from the citizens themselves and 
their domestic political evolution, though, as well as from international pressure.  A 
modern bureaucracy itself may, if allowed by the country’s citizens, only serve to 
strengthen the authoritarian government in place (as it did to not only Japan, South Korea 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The process of democratizations has been at the forefront of political science for 
decades, and the promotion of democracy is a key component of international affairs (and 
even the National Security Strategy of the United States).  Couple this with the belief in 
the Democratic Peace theory, determining ways in which democratization can be 
successfully undertaken has achieved paramount importance to academics and diplomats 
alike.  Unfortunately, so many countries that have undergone transformations towards 
democracy have failed.  Scholars have, to their best knowledge, determined that the root 
cause for most of these failures are either a) the lack of economic modernity and stability 
during the process of democratization; b) the inherent weakness of the state in question, 
which cannot support democratization, especially during crises; or c) a combination of 
both.  So, determining the strength and stability of a state’s economic and bureaucratic 
institutions would go a long way towards more accurately predicting whether or not a 
country can successfully complete the process of democratization.   
This begs the questions:  Why have some developing states successfully achieved 
democracy and others have not?  How can a developing state achieve the requisite 
economic and bureaucratic institutions in order to successfully democratize?  The answer 
for the first question can be found in the colonial legacy of the countries in question.  
This paper has described the impacts of the Japanese colonial legacy on the development 
of Korea and Taiwan.  By tracing the development of specific economic and bureaucratic 
institutions in Japan during the Meiji Revolution, analyzing their implementation and 
further development in Korea and Taiwan, and testing their relevance to Post-WWII 
development in these countries, this paper has shown the relevance of the Japanese 
colonial legacy to the success (whether of the state development, the economic growth, or 
of their democratization) of these countries today.   
Further research should be completed to assess how best to cultivate these 
institutions in developing countries, and whether or not this would be possible without 
having to resort to a harsh period of colonialism.  Can these institutions be implemented 
in developing countries without a harsh colonial period?  It is possible that in some 
developing states, the cultures and customs of the indigenous society are so vastly 
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different from the types of society in which modern bureaucracy and other institutions 
would flourish that attempting to impose these institutions would run completely counter 
to the wants of the citizens of that country.  In this case, cultivating these institutions 
would prove much more difficult, if not impossible, without some crisis or other strong 
impetus for change.   
On the other hand, it can also be argued that the developing countries today have 
a better chance of succeeding as South Korea and Taiwan have.  These countries can 
clearly see the examples of South Korea, Taiwan and other recently-developed countries, 
who utilized strong, central states to modernize their economy and bureaucracy.  Seeing 
the success of these countries, developing states now can attempt to model their own 
countries in like fashion.  Furthermore, the majority of developed countries are 
participants of a variety of international organizations that promote economic 
modernization, one of the essential components of success for a developing country.  
These resources are available to any developing country that is willing to take the first 
step.  
These questions still remain unanswered, yet seeking the answers to these 
questions, as well as to the others presented in this paper, would better direct the 
programs and aid that developed countries can propose and implement in developing 
countries in order to best promote democracy and, ultimately, peace.   
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